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A Reduced Form Coefficients Analysis of Executive Ownership, Corporate Value, and Executive Compensation

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  • Marsha Weber
  • Donna Dudney

Abstract

Most simultaneous equations studies analyze the coefficients from the structural forms of the models, which provide estimates of the direct effects of independent variables on the dependent variables in each equation, but ignore the indirect effects these independent variables have on dependent variables in other equations. This paper modifies the work of Chung and Pruitt (1996) by extending the model to include board composition and institutional ownership variables and then estimating the structural and derived reduced form coefficients for the extended model. The signs and significance of the reduced form coefficients differ in several material respects from the results of the structural form coefficient analysis, which suggests that analysis of only the structural form coefficients is incorrect and potentially misleading.

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  • Marsha Weber & Donna Dudney, 2003. "A Reduced Form Coefficients Analysis of Executive Ownership, Corporate Value, and Executive Compensation," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(3), pages 399-413, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:38:y:2003:i:3:p:399-413
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6288.00052
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    References listed on IDEAS

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