Gestion des résultats, atteinte des seuils et coût d'endettement

This paper investigates the effect of both earnings management and beating earnings benchmarks on the cost of debt. Based on a sample of 380 American firms (selected from Fortune 1000), for the period 1996-2004, our results show that discretionary accruals provide additional information to creditors about the financial situation of the firm. Specifically, firms with extreme positive and negative discretionary accruals incur a higher cost of debt because these firms are more likely to experience future financial distress than firms with moderate accruals. Moreover, the results show that firms beating earnings benchmarks are valued by creditors. In fact, we find an inverse and significant relation between the cost of debt and beating earnings benchmarks. In particular, with regard to two thresholds: zero earnings and the last year earnings, beating the zero earnings benchmark provides the biggest reward in terms of a lower cost of debt because it's the most salient benchmark in assuring creditors that the firm will survive and satisfy its financial obligations. Additional analyses indicate that the reduction in the cost of debt is attenuated but not disappear for firms beating earnings benchmarks through earnings management.