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Farsighted Strategies in the Formation of a Communication Network

Author

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  • Frédéric Deroïan

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

I examine the formation of a specific communication network, a variant of the two-way flow model, in which agents have farsighted strategies. I show that the likelihood to form efficient networks tends to zero for sufficiently large network sizes.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Deroïan, 2003. "Farsighted Strategies in the Formation of a Communication Network," Post-Print halshs-00369727, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00369727
    DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00122-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kirman, Alan P & Oddou, Claude & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 129-138, January.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    3. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
    4. Watts, Alison, 2002. "Non-myopic formation of circle networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 277-282, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2006. "Network formation with heterogeneous players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 353-372, February.
    2. Page, Frank Jr. & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2005. "Networks and farsighted stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 257-269, February.
    3. Joost Vandenbossche & Thomas Demuynck, 2013. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Agents and Absolute Friction," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(1), pages 23-45, June.
    4. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency," Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    5. Schuster, Stephan, 2010. "Network Formation with Adaptive Agents," MPRA Paper 27388, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Page, Jr. Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna H & Kamat, Samir, 2004. "Farsightedly Basic Networks," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 702, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    7. Frédéric Deroïan, 2006. "Formation of a Communication Network Under Perfect Foresight," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 191-204, November.
    8. Mahesh Nagarajan & Greys Sošić, 2009. "Coalition Stability in Assembly Models," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 57(1), pages 131-145, February.
    9. Dev, Pritha, 2010. "Identity and Fragmentation in Networks," MPRA Paper 21632, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Yangbo Song & Mihaela Schaar, 2020. "Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 345-384, June.
    11. Dev, Pritha, 2010. "Choosing `Me' and `My Friends': Identity in a Non-Cooperative Network Formation Game with Cost Sharing," MPRA Paper 21631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Schuster, Stephan, 2012. "Applications in Agent-Based Computational Economics," MPRA Paper 47201, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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