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The Formation of Social Preferences: Some Lessons from Psychology and Biology

Author

Listed:
  • Louis Lévy-Garboua

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal)

  • Claude Meidinger

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Benoît Rapoport

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to draw some lessons for economic theory from research in psychology, social psychology and more briefly, in biology which purports to explain the "formation" of social preferences. We elicit the basic mechanisms whereby a variety of social preferences are determined in a variety of social contexts. Biological mechanisms, cultural transmission, learning and the formation of cognitive and emotional capacities shape social preferenes in the long or very long run. In the short run, te built-in capacities are utilized by individuals to construct their own context-dependent social preferences. The full development of social preferences requires consciousness of the individual's similarities and differences with others and therefore knowledge of self and others. A wide variety of context-dependent social preferences can be generated by just three cognitive processes: identification of self with known others, projection of known self onto partially unknown others, and categorization of others by similarity with self. The self can project onto similar others but is unable to do so onto dissimilar others. The more can be self identify with, or project onto, an other the more generous she will be. Thus the self will find it easier to internalize and predict the behavior of an in-group than an out-group and will generally like to interact more with the former than with the latter. The main social motivations can be simply organized by reference to social norms of justice or fairness that lead to reciprocal behavior, some kind of self-anchored altruism that provokes in-group favoritism and social drives which determine an immediate emotional response to an experienced event like hurting a norm's violator or helping an other in need.
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Suggested Citation

  • Louis Lévy-Garboua & Claude Meidinger & Benoît Rapoport, 2006. "The Formation of Social Preferences: Some Lessons from Psychology and Biology," Post-Print halshs-00311157, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00311157
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Batifoulier & Nicolas Da Silva, 2014. "The economic behaviour of doctors: medical altruism without an ethic?," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-9, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    2. Lévy-Garboua, Louis & Masclet, David & Montmarquette, Claude, 2009. "A behavioral Laffer curve: Emergence of a social norm of fairness in a real effort experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 147-161, April.
    3. Louis Lévy-Garboua & David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette, 2008. "A Behavioral Laffer Curve: Emergence of a Social Norm of Fairness in a Real Effort Experiment," Working Papers hal-00340459, HAL.
    4. Ganglmair, Bernhard & Holcomb, Alex & Myung, Noah, 2020. "Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 244-267.
    5. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Philip Verwimp, 2016. "Pro-social behavior after a disaster: parochial or universal? Evidence from a natural experiment in Belgium," Working Papers CEB 16-054, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Lévy-Garboua, Louis & Masclet, David & Montmarquette, Claude, 2009. "A behavioral Laffer curve: Emergence of a social norm of fairness in a real effort experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 147-161, April.
    7. Philippe Batifoulier & Nicolas Da Silva, 2014. "Medical Altruism in Mainstream Health Economics: Theoretical and Political Paradoxes," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 72(3), pages 261-279, September.
    8. Ola Andersson & Håkan J. Holm & Jean-Robert Tyran & Erik Wengström, 2016. "Deciding for Others Reduces Loss Aversion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(1), pages 29-36, January.
    9. Sarah Brown & Preety Srivastava & Karl Taylor, 2015. "Intergenerational analysis of the donating behavior of parents and their offspring," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(1), pages 122-151, July.
    10. Ganglmair, Bernhard & Holcomb, Alex & Myung, Noah, 2016. "Cutthroats or comrades: Information sharing among competing fund managers," MPRA Paper 71506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2010. "Social Incentives in the Workplace," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(2), pages 417-458.
    12. Ben-Ner, Avner & List, John A. & Putterman, Louis & Samek, Anya, 2017. "Learned generosity? An artefactual field experiment with parents and their children," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 28-44.
    13. Küpper, Hans-Ulrich & Sandner, Kai, 2008. "Differences in Social Preferences - Are They Profitable for the Firm?," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 2122, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.
    14. Jean Mercier-Ythier, 2010. "The Aggregation of Individual Distributive Preferences through the Distributive Liberal Social Contract : Normative Analysis," Working Papers of BETA 2010-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    15. Andreas Wagener, 2012. "Why Do People (Not) Cough in Concerts? The Economics of Concert Etiquette," ACEI Working Paper Series AWP-05-2012, Association for Cultural Economics International, revised Dec 2012.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Preferences;

    JEL classification:

    • B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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