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Evolution et déterminants de la crédibilité de l'Union Monétaire Européenne durant la phase de transition : une étude comparative France, Italie et Grande Bretagne

Author

Listed:
  • Raphaëlle Bellando

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [UMR6586] - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • S. Pfister
  • Jean-Paul Pollin

    (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans [UMR6586] - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

[fre] Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons à la crédibilité qu’accordaient les marchés financiers à l’entrée de certains pays (France, Italie et Grande-Bretagne) dans l’Union monétaire européenne, au cours de la période de transition. Pour ce faire, nous calculons un indicateur égal à l’écart de taux implicites en 1999 et en 2002 entre le pays et l’Allemagne. Après avoir examiné le profil temporel de ces écarts dans les années 1990, nous tentons d’en expliquer les variations. Pour la France, la crédibilité du projet de monnaie unique semble fondée sur le coût que le pays a accepté de supporter en termes d’emplois et de croissance perdus. Dans le cas de l’Italie, l’effort à consentir s’exprimait essentiellement par référence à l’Allemagne, ce qui tend à prouver que le processus de convergence s’est identifié en réalité à un alignement sur la situation allemande. Pour la Grande-Bretagne dont l’entrée n’est plausible qu’à l’horizon 2002, l’effet des variables est inversé : tout se passe donc comme si les marchés avaient considéré que l’entrée de la livre dans l’euro ne pouvait se concevoir qu’à condition que son coût économique ne soit pas trop élevé, ce qui ne fait que refléter les préférences affichées dans le discours de politique économique britannique. . Classification JEL : E43, F15 [eng] What are the determinants of EMU credibility during the transition years ?. We measure and explain the evolution of the monetary union credibility as appreciated by financial markets for some countries (France, Italy, Great Britain) during the transition period toward EMU. To do this, we calculate the difference between forward rate for 1999 and 2000 implicit to the country term structure of interest rates, and those implied in the German term structure. For France, both weakness of growth, and rise in unemployment explain an increase in the credibility of the union. For Italy, our measurement of credibility is dependant on the difference between domestic and German’s economi
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Suggested Citation

  • Raphaëlle Bellando & S. Pfister & Jean-Paul Pollin, 2000. "Evolution et déterminants de la crédibilité de l'Union Monétaire Européenne durant la phase de transition : une étude comparative France, Italie et Grande Bretagne," Post-Print halshs-00287977, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00287977
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Favero, Carlo A. & Giavazzi, Francesco & Iacone, Fabrizio & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Extracting information from asset prices: The methodology of EMU calculators," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1607-1632, October.
    2. Bensaid, Bernard & Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "The instability of fixed exchange rate systems when raising the nominal interest rate is costly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1461-1478, August.
    3. De Grauwe, Paul, 1996. "Forward Interest Rates as Predictors of EMU," CEPR Discussion Papers 1395, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(3), pages 735-754.
    5. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Destabilizing effects of exchange-rate escape clauses," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 61-77, August.
    6. Rose, Andrew K. & Svensson, Lars E. O., 1994. "European exchange rate credibility before the fall," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 1185-1216, June.
    7. Lars E. O. Svensson, 1992. "An Interpretation of Recent Research on Exchange Rate Target Zones," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 119-144, Fall.
    8. Masson, Paul R, 1995. "Gaining and Losing ERM Credibility: The Case of the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 571-582, May.
    9. Olivier Jeanne, 1996. "Les modèles de crise de change : un essai de synthèse en relation avec la crise du franc de 1992-1993," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 123(2), pages 147-162.
    10. Bernard Bensaïd & Olivier Jeanne, 1996. "Fragilité des systèmes de change fixe et contrôle des capitaux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 123(2), pages 163-174.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution; déterminants; crédibilité; Union; Monétaire; Européenne; phase; transition; étude; comparative; France; Italie; Grande Bretagne;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

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