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Stratégies d'accès à l'estime de soi et relation d'emploi

Author

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  • Olivier Baguelin

    (EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

A model of employment relation is provided in which agents choose whether to seek self-esteem through work. When they do, they develop an intrinsic motivation to effort. Depending on non-wage characteristics of the job the employer wants to fill, she can encourage this intrinsic motivation by a well-designed contract. We show that the profitability as well as the efficiency of the employment relation may depend on non-wage gratification opportunities workers get.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Baguelin, 2005. "Stratégies d'accès à l'estime de soi et relation d'emploi," Post-Print halshs-00196110, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00196110
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00196110
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    intrinsic motivation; self-esteem; moral hazard; profitability; efficiency; motivation intrinsèque; estime de soi; aléa moral; profitabilité; efficacité;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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