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La gouvernance de la Banque mondiale accorde-t-elle le pouvoir décisionnel aux PID membres de l'OCDE ?

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  • Arthur Foch

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This article concerns the governance of the World Bank (WB) and tries to determine if it grants the decision-making power to Most Developed Countries (MDC) of the OECD. First of all, we demonstrate that these countries have effectively the decision-making power within three authorities of decision of the Bank. They are so capable of determining on their own the allocation of WB lending and conditionality. In this way, our study contributes to the literature relative to the governance of the international financial institutions (IFI) by wondering about the concrete implications of the distribution of votes within the WB. In a second time, we show that several characteristics of the governance of the WB, allow to maintain and to strengthen the power of the MDC (OECD) within the institution. The interest of this study is to show that if, not only the system of vote of the WB in proportion to the financial contributions is actually widely favourable to the MDC (OEDC), moreover, the formal rules of governance grant them the decision-making power within three authorities of decision of the Bank. This study joins in the debate concernig the legitimacy of the World Bank. If the MDC (OECD) have the decision-making power within the decision-making authorities of the WD, the multilateral character of this institution can be questioned.

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Foch, 2007. "La gouvernance de la Banque mondiale accorde-t-elle le pouvoir décisionnel aux PID membres de l'OCDE ?," Post-Print halshs-00155767, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00155767
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00155767
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