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A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems

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  • Hervé Crès

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

A simple parametric general equilibrium model with S states of nature and K

Suggested Citation

  • Hervé Crès, 2006. "A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems," Post-Print halshs-00119536, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00119536
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
    3. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-01065004, HAL.
    4. Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February.
    5. Simon Benninga & Eitan Muller, 1979. "Majority Choice and the Objective Function of the Firm under Uncertainty," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(2), pages 670-682, Autumn.
    6. Helpman, Elhanan & Razin, Assaf, 1978. "Participation Equilibrium and the Efficiency of Stock Market Allocations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 19(1), pages 129-140, February.
    7. Steinar Ekern & Robert Wilson, 1974. "On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(1), pages 171-180, Spring.
    8. Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1996. "The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-245.
    9. Geanakoplos, J. & Magill, M. & Quinzii, M. & Dreze, J., 1990. "Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 113-151.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
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