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Does Asset Encumbrance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from Covered Bonds

Author

Listed:
  • Emilia Garcia-Appendini

    (UZH - Universität Zürich [Zürich] = University of Zurich)

  • Stefano Gatti

    (Bocconi University [Milan, Italy])

  • Giacomo Nocera

    (Audencia Business School)

Abstract

Theories suggest that asset encumbrance, the ring-fencing of certain assets for protected debtholders, can affect banks' risk-taking and lead to funding instability. We test these hypotheses using a unique, hand-collected dataset on outstanding covered bonds issued by a sample of listed European banks. Our results suggest that the effect of asset encumbrance on risk depends on the proportion of debtholders exerting market discipline and on the bank's liquidity buffers. We deal with concerns regarding omitted variables and reverse causality using several fixed effects estimations and an instrumental variables approach. Our findings can alert policymakers about potential side effects of policy interventions that can induce an increase of asset encumbrance in banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilia Garcia-Appendini & Stefano Gatti & Giacomo Nocera, 2022. "Does Asset Encumbrance Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from Covered Bonds," Post-Print hal-04057165, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04057165
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106705
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04057165
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruno, Brunella & Marino, Immacolata & Nocera, Giacomo, 2023. "Internal ratings and bank opacity: Evidence from analysts’ forecasts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    2. Cipollini, Fabrizio & Ielasi, Federica & Querci, Francesca, 2024. "Asset encumbrance in banks: Is systemic risk affected?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PA).
    3. Brunella Bruno & Immacolata Marino & Giacomo Nocera, 2023. "Internal Ratings, Non-Performing Loans, and Bank Opacity: Evidence from Analysts’ Forecasts," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23195, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. B. Bruno & I. Marino & G. Nocera, 2023. "Internal Ratings and Bank Opacity: Evidence from Analysts’ Forecasts," Post-Print hal-04322520, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asset encumbrance; Covered bond; Market discipline; Debt priority; Bank risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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