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The Routledge Handbook of State-Owned Enterprises

Author

Listed:
  • Luc Bernier

    (University of Ottawa [Ottawa])

  • Massimo Florio
  • Philippe Bance

Abstract

State-owned enterprises make up roughly 10 percent of the world economy, yet they are woefully understudied. This handbook offers the first synthesis of the topic since the 1980s and offers a comprehensive reference for a generation. The authors provide a detailed explanation of the theory that underpins the expansion of state-owned enterprises in the 21st century. Each chapter delivers an overview of current knowledge, as well as identifying issues and relevant debates for future research. The authors explain how state-owned enterprises are used in both developed and developing countries and offer an insight into complex and fascinating organizations such as the German municipal conglomerates or the multinational companies owned by states. New modes of governance and regulation have been invented to make sure they act in the public interest. This handbook brings together a wealth of international scholars, offering multiple theoretical perspectives to help shape a brave new world. It will be of interest to teachers and students of Economics, Public Administration and Business, academics, established researchers and PhD students seeking rigorous literature reviews on specific aspects of SOEs, as well as practitioners and decision makers in international organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Luc Bernier & Massimo Florio & Philippe Bance, 2020. "The Routledge Handbook of State-Owned Enterprises," Post-Print hal-02613944, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02613944
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Lo, Dic & Gao, Ling & Lin, Yuchen, 2022. "State ownership and innovations: Lessons from the mixed-ownership reforms of China's listed companies," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 302-314.
    2. Massimo Florio, 2021. "Knowledge creation: new frontiers for public investment," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(3), pages 379-386, September.
    3. Massimo Florio & Simona Gamba, 2021. "Biomed Europa: After the coronavirus, a public infrastructure to overcome the pharmaceutical oligopoly," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(3), pages 387-409, September.
    4. Clò, Stefano & Frigerio, Marco & Vandone, Daniela, 2022. "Financial support to innovation: The role of European development financial institutions," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(10).
    5. Audinga Baltrunaite & Mario Cannella & Sauro Mocetti & Giacomo Roma, "undated". "Board composition and performance of state-owned enterprises: Quasi-experimental evidence," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1328, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    6. María del Carmen SÁNCHEZ CARREIRA, 2021. "Accountability and transparency policies in Spanish Public-Owned Enterprises (POEs) / Spain," CIRIEC Studies Series, in: Andrea ZATTI & CIRIEC (ed.), Accountability, anti-corruption, and transparency policies in Public-Owned Enterprises (POEs), volume 2, chapter 0, pages 61-83, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    7. Andrea ZATTI, 2021. "Public-Owned Enterprises (POEs): definition, evolution, and evaluation / Context," CIRIEC Studies Series, in: Andrea ZATTI & CIRIEC (ed.), Accountability, anti-corruption, and transparency policies in Public-Owned Enterprises (POEs), volume 2, chapter 0, pages 21-42, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    8. Szarzec, Katarzyna & Dombi, Ákos & Matuszak, Piotr, 2021. "State-owned enterprises and economic growth: Evidence from the post-Lehman period," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    9. Adeyemi Adebayo, 2022. "What Do State-Owned Development Financial Institutions (Sodfis) In South Africa Do?," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 67(235), pages 123-152, October –.
    10. Andrea Zatti, 2022. "Accountability, anti-corruption, and transparency policies in Public owned enterprises (POEs): The case of Italy," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2022(1), pages 43-78.
    11. Andrea ZATTI, 2021. "Introduction," CIRIEC Studies Series, in: Andrea ZATTI & CIRIEC (ed.), Accountability, anti-corruption, and transparency policies in Public-Owned Enterprises (POEs), volume 2, chapter 0, pages 9-19, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    12. Roxana Manuela Dicu & Ioan-Bogdan Robu & George-Marian Aevoae & Daniela-Neonila Mardiros, 2020. "Rethinking the Role of M&As in Promoting Sustainable Development: Empirical Evidence Regarding the Relation Between the Audit Opinion and the Sustainable Performance of the Romanian Target Companies," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-17, October.

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