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Groundwater Management Lessons from Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Guillermo Donoso

    (UC - Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

  • Elisabeth Lictevout

    (HSM - Hydrosciences Montpellier - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Daniel Rinaudo

    (BRGM - Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières)

Abstract

Groundwater has increasingly become a water supply source in Chile. In the future this trend is expected to grow as a consequence of the increased water use due to economic growth, together with population growth, urbanization, water contamination and pollution, as well as the projected climate change impacts. The Water Code of 1981, as well as previous water codes, were in essence designed for surface water and, thus, contained only few references to groundwater. This regulatory absence has been covered with groundwater guidelines established through internal administrative acts. As it stands, the legal and institutional context considers the required instruments and mechanisms to balance growing demand and the need to protect and preserve groundwater resources. This chapter investigates whether this framework has been effective to ensure that groundwater is managed sustainably, through the analysis of two cases located in an arid region of northern Chile: the Copiapó Valley and the Pampa del Tamarugal Aquifer.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillermo Donoso & Elisabeth Lictevout & Jean-Daniel Rinaudo, 2020. "Groundwater Management Lessons from Chile," Post-Print hal-02532177, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02532177
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-32766-8_25
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02532177
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    2. Jean-Daniel Rinaudo & Guillermo Donoso, 2019. "State, market or community failure? Untangling the determinants of groundwater depletion in Copiapó (Chile)," International Journal of Water Resources Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(2), pages 283-304, March.
    3. Kemper, K. E., 2007. "Instruments and institutions for groundwater management," IWMI Books, Reports H040046, International Water Management Institute.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fuentes, Ignacio & Vervoort, R. Willem & McPhee, James & Rojas, Luis A. Reyes, 2024. "Agricultural water accounting: Complementing a governance monitoring schema with remote sensing calculations at different scales," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 292(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Groundwater governance; groundwater management; collective groundwater management; groundwater communities; Chile 522;
    All these keywords.

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