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L’entreprise publique algérienne : changement organisationnel et refondation du lien social

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  • Khaled Tahari

    (Faculté des Sciences Économiques, Université d’Oran)

Abstract

N° 16 Janvier-Juin 2014 • Développement et renforcement du lien social L'entreprise publique algérienne : changement organisationnel et refondation du lien social Dans le contexte de la mondialisation, l'Algérie connaît à partir des années 1990 un changement de stratégie économique en optant pour une transition vers l'économie de marché, qui marque le renoncement à la régulation par le plan au profit des règles du marché. Pour être efficace, ce changement en Algérie devait en finir avec des rentes statiques de situation liées à la position occupée dans les hiérarchies sociales justifiant des privilèges. Ce changement devait affirmer la prépondérance du marché sur les liens administratifs hiérarchiques de l'entreprise comme lien social dominant et remplacer l'ancienne GRH politique par une GRH inscrite dans une logique productive économique. Les entreprises publiques qui ont survécu à ces restructurations ont évolué en fait vers une organisation hybride qui conjugue les éléments d'une gestion politique qui survit avec ceux d'une gestion centrée sur l'exigence économique.

Suggested Citation

  • Khaled Tahari, 2014. "L’entreprise publique algérienne : changement organisationnel et refondation du lien social," Post-Print hal-01856771, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01856771
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01856771
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Raouf BOUCEKKINE & Rafik BOUKLIA-HASSANE, 2011. "Rente, corruption et violence : l’émergence d’un ordre nouveau dans les pays arabes ?," Regards économiques 92, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
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