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The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government

Author

Listed:
  • Rongili Biswas

    (Maulana Azad College, POLIS - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - University of Eastern Piedmont)

  • Nicolas Gravel

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Rémy Oddou

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper examines the segregative properties of Tiebout-type process of jurisdiction formation by freely mobile households in the presence of a central government which makes equalization transfers across jurisdictions so as to maximize a generalized utilitarian or a max–min objective. It is shown that the introduction of such a central government significantly affects the set of stable jurisdiction structures. It is also shown that the class of households additively separable preferences that guarantees the wealth segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure is unaffected by the presence of a central government if this government uses a generalized utilitarian objective. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Rongili Biswas & Nicolas Gravel & Rémy Oddou, 2013. "The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government," Post-Print hal-01502442, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01502442
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benoît Tarroux, 2012. "Are equalization payments making Canadians better off? A two-dimensional dominance answer," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 10(1), pages 19-44, March.
    2. Gravel, Nicolas & Thoron, Sylvie, 2007. "Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 569-583, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Calabrese, Stephen & Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard, 2023. "Majority choice of taxation and redistribution in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    2. Gravel, Nicolas & Oddou, Rémy, 2014. "The segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation with a land market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 15-27.
    3. Remy Oddou, 2015. "Firms location and sorting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(3), pages 1782-1787.

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