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The Payment System and Liquidity Provision during the US National Banking Era

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  • Laurent Le Maux

    (LED - Laboratoire d'Economie Dionysien - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis)

Abstract

This essay distinguishes hand-to-hand currency shortage from the funding liquidity crisis in order to apprehend the nature of disruptions of the payment system during the US National Banking Era (1863–1913). Different analytical categories are thus inferred, namely, runs to currency and to liquidity, seasonality and instability of the interest rate, and issuance of small-denominated certificates and large-denominated loan certificates by the Clearing Houses. All of these categories were particularly intertwined under the National Banking System, which may have led to a quid pro quo related to the expected functions of the Federal Reserve System.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Le Maux, 2013. "The Payment System and Liquidity Provision during the US National Banking Era," Post-Print hal-01399603, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01399603
    DOI: 10.1057/ces.2013.12
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01399603
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