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On the dynamics of legal convergence

Author

Listed:
  • Bertrand Crettez
  • Bruno Deffains
  • Olivier Musy

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the dynamics of legal rules in a model with two nation-states playing a non cooperative game. For each country, changing the legal system is a costly process. At the same time, the existence of different legal systems is also costly for all nation-states. We show that despite the non cooperative behavior of countries, a process of legal convergence is achieved in the long run through small step by step changes. This result depends neither on the number of players in the game, nor on the time horizon of policy makers. Complete legal convergence can be obtained in a finite time. Coordinated efforts to achieve legal convergence are then unnecessary. We show that they might even be counterproductive, in the sense that the welfare of nation-states is higher under legal competition, compared to cooperative legal unification. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Olivier Musy, 2013. "On the dynamics of legal convergence," Post-Print hal-01385814, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01385814
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Crettez Bertrand & Deffains Bruno & Musy Olivier, 2016. "Convergence of Legal Rules: Comparing Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Processes," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 13-35, March.
    2. Crettez, Bertrand & Deffains, Bruno & Musy, Olivier, 2014. "Legal convergence and endogenous preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 20-27.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

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