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Between Bureaucracy and Market: Chinese Industrial Groups in Search of New Forms of Corporate Governance

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  • Jean-François Huchet

    (CEFC - Centre d'études français sur la Chine contemporaine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Xavier Richet

    (ICEE - ICEE - Intégration et Coopération dans l'Espace Européen - Etudes Européennes - EA 2291 - Université Sorbonne Nouvelle - Paris 3)

Abstract

This paper investigates the peculiar and contradictory nature of the on-going construction of a system of corporate governance in China. The analysis attempts to overcome the limits of traditional corporate studies that tend to focus on enterprise management, and puts the issue within the framework of the systemic and political relationships that shape economic management and state intervention in large enterprises in transitional socialist systems. The emergence of a specific managerial culture within the market and of winners among the enterprises is related to the position still held by the state in the enterprise asset, and by the access to competitive markets available to the enterprises. State owned enterprises, enjoy the protection of their status but they are more successful and adopt a more profit-oriented management culture if they operate in the internationalised and competitive markets rather than in the strategical lowprofit, state-dominated sectors. Due to continuous interaction between enterprise management and external (policy or macro-economic) factors, and to the absence or underdevelopment of most of the institutions generally necessary for a sound corporate governance system (financial markets, bank independence, free press etc.) the privatisation does not seem sufficient to engender all round market-led governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Huchet & Xavier Richet, 2002. "Between Bureaucracy and Market: Chinese Industrial Groups in Search of New Forms of Corporate Governance," Post-Print hal-01331919, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01331919
    DOI: 10.1080/14631370220139918
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inalco.hal.science/hal-01331919
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thierry Pairault, 2010. "Le rôle des investissements directs étrangers entrants et sortants en Chine : une appréciation," Post-Print halshs-00982768, HAL.
    2. Stephen Green & Jenna Ho, 2004. "Old stocks, new owners: Two cases of ownership change in China's stock market," Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(3), pages 267-280.
    3. Jean-François Huchet, 2014. "From Dirigisme to Realism: Chinese Industrial Policy in the Era of Globalisation," Post-Print hal-01325264, HAL.
    4. Li, Ke, 2007. "Transaction cost, corporate governance and division of labor--A general equilibrium analysis of professional managers and its implication to China's practice," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 447-468, September.
    5. Choon-Yin Sam, 2013. "Partial privatisation and the role of state owned holding companies in China," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(3), pages 767-789, August.

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