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On non-responsiveness in adverse selection models with common value

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-Henri Morand

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Lionel Thomas

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

In common value models, it is possible that the full information efficiency and the incentive constraint require the quantity of full and asymmetric information to move in opposite directions with the type. This conflict is called non-responsiveness. Most of those models share the features that when there is conflict, the optimal contract is pooling otherwise it is separating. In this note, we will show that, in fact, the robustness of the links between the conflict and separating contracts is not a general consequence of the common value models: it depends crucially on the assumption made in all those models that the principal's marginal benefit from trade with full information is not distorted by the presence of informational rents.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Henri Morand & Lionel Thomas, 2003. "On non-responsiveness in adverse selection models with common value," Post-Print hal-01313421, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01313421
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    Cited by:

    1. hector chade, 2016. "The Market for Lemons: Costly Insurance, Coverage Denials, and Pooling," 2016 Meeting Papers 1097, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Michael Kuhn, "undated". "Delegating Budgets when Agents Care About Autonomy," Discussion Papers 04/10, Department of Economics, University of York.
    3. Chade, Hector & Schlee, Edward E., 2020. "Insurance as a lemons market: Coverage denials and pooling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5993 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kuhn, Michael & Gundlach, Erich, 2006. "Delegating budgets when agents care about autonomy," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 69, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    6. Castro-Pires, Henrique & Moreira, Humberto, 2021. "Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 73-103.
    7. Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R., 2004. "Duality in procurement design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 411-428, June.
    8. Ollier, Sandrine & Thomas, Lionel, 2013. "Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2383-2403.

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