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On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games

Author

Listed:
  • Fabrice Barthélémy

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Dominique Lepelley

    (CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion)

  • Mathieu Martin

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a "dummy" player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon and to compute its likelihood. It is shown that the probability of having a dummy player is surprisingly high and some paradoxical results are observed.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrice Barthélémy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin, 2012. "On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games," Post-Print hal-01243433, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243433
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0683-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William V. Gehrlein, 2002. "Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 503-512.
    2. Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008. "On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.
    3. Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.
    4. Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151, Elsevier.
    5. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Power Indices as an Aid to Institutional Design: The Generalised Apportionment Problem," Economic Research Papers 269461, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zineb Abidi & Matthieu Leprince & Vincent Merlin, 2020. "Power Inequality in Inter-communal Structures: The Simulated Impact of a Reform in the Case of the Municipalities in Western France," Post-Print halshs-02996998, HAL.
    2. Dominique Lepelley & Vincent R Merlin & Jean-louis Rouet & Laurent Vidu, 2014. "Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(4), pages 2201-2207.
    3. Boratyn, Daria & Kirsch, Werner & Słomczyński, Wojciech & Stolicki, Dariusz & Życzkowski, Karol, 2020. "Average weights and power in weighted voting games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 90-99.
    4. Fabrice Barthelemy & Dominique Lepelley & Mathieu Martin & Hatem Smaoui, 2021. "Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 43-61, February.
    5. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou, 2022. "Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 75-103, April.
    6. Fabrice Barthélémy & Mathieu Martin, 2021. "Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 299-315, Springer.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics general; Economic Theory; Revue AERES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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