IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01089003.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Le banquier central, du mutisme à la communication permanente : la tonalité du discours de la B.C.E. et son impact

Author

Listed:
  • Mickaël Clévenot

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Ludovic Desmedt

    (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Matthieu Llorca

    (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Nous proposons une études théorique et empirique de l'influence du discours de la BCE à travers l'analyse des éditoriaux des bulletins mensuels. Le résultat principal est que le discours n'a qu'une influence très relative sur les variables réelles et dès qu'on réintègre les taux, l'influence du discours disparaît. Le discours apparaît donc juste comme enregistrant la conjoncture et accompagnant l'évolution des taux. Le discours en tant que tel n'a pas de réel impact en dehors du fait qu'il est corrélé à la politique monétaire si bien que cela peu entraîner une confusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Mickaël Clévenot & Ludovic Desmedt & Matthieu Llorca, 2010. "Le banquier central, du mutisme à la communication permanente : la tonalité du discours de la B.C.E. et son impact," Post-Print hal-01089003, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01089003
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01089003v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01089003v1/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. Madeline Zavodny & Donna K. Ginther, 2005. "Does the Beige Book Move Financial Markets?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 138-151, July.
    3. Ben S. Bernanke & Vincent R. Reinhart & Brian P. Sack, 2004. "Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 35(2), pages 1-100.
    4. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2009. "Purdah—On the Rationale for Central Bank Silence around Policy Meetings," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2‐3), pages 517-528, March.
    5. Kaminsky, Graciela L. & Lewis, Karen K., 1996. "Does foreign exchange intervention signal future monetary policy?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 285-312, April.
    6. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jan‐Egbert Sturm, 2011. "Does money matter in the ECB strategy? New evidence based on ECB communication," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(1), pages 16-31, January.
    7. Michael Woodford, 2005. "Central bank communication and policy effectiveness," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 399-474.
    8. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    9. Carlo Rosa & Giovanni Verga, 2006. "The Impact of Central Bank Announcements on Asset Prices in Real Time: Testing the Efficiency of the Euribor Futures Market," CEP Discussion Papers dp0764, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    10. Rosa, Carlo & Verga, Giovanni, 2007. "On the consistency and effectiveness of central bank communication: Evidence from the ECB," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 146-175, March.
    11. Gerlach, Stefan, 2004. "Interest Rate Setting by the ECB: Words and Deeds," CEPR Discussion Papers 4775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Sheila C. Dow, 2008. "Monetary Policy," Chapters, in: John B. Davis & Wilfred Dolfsma (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Social Economics, chapter 26, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Sheila Dow & Matthias Klaes & Alberto Montagnoli, 2009. "Risk And Uncertainty In Central Bank Signals: An Analysis Of Monetary Policy Committee Minutes," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 584-618, November.
    14. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mickaël Clévenot & Ludovic Desmedt & Matthieu Llorca, 2015. "The Power of Words: Issuance and Reception of Central Banker's Discourse [Le pouvoir des mots : émission et réception du discours du banquier central]," Post-Print hal-04711754, HAL.
    2. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    3. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    4. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2007. "The timing of central bank communication," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 124-145, March.
    5. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Donato Masciandaro & Oana Peia & Davide Romelli, 2024. "Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 365-388, April.
    7. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    8. Carlo Rosa & Giovanni Verga, 2006. "The Impact of Central Bank Announcements on Asset Prices in Real Time: Testing the Efficiency of the Euribor Futures Market," CEP Discussion Papers dp0764, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5221 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Gaia Rubera, 2021. "Monetary policy and financial markets: evidence from Twitter traffic," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21160, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Freddy H. CASTRO, 2012. "Senales de política monetaria y movimientos en la estructura a plazo de la tasa de interés en Colombia," Archivos de Economía 9908, Departamento Nacional de Planeación.
    12. Trunin, Pavel (Трунин, Павел) & Bozhechkova, Alexandra (Божечкова, Александра) & Goryunov, Eugene (Горюнов, Евгений) & Petrova, Diana, 2017. "Analysis of Approaches to Accounting of the Information Effects of Monetary Policy [Анализ Подходов К Учету Информационных Эффектов Денежно-Кредитной Политики]," Working Papers 031723, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    13. Esteban Colla de Robertis, 2010. "Monetary Policy Committees and the Decision to Publish Voting Records," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 97-139, July-Dece.
    14. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5221 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Sheila Dow & Matthias Klaes & Alberto Montagnoli, 2009. "Risk And Uncertainty In Central Bank Signals: An Analysis Of Monetary Policy Committee Minutes," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 584-618, November.
    16. Michael Woodford, 2012. "Methods of policy accommodation at the interest-rate lower bound," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 185-288.
    17. Rodolfo Tomás Da Fonseca Nicolay & Gabriel Caldas Montes, 2014. "Comunicação Do Banco Central,Expectativas De Inflação E Profecia Auto-Realizável: Evidências Para Obrasil," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 046, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    18. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2005. "How should central banks communicate?," Working Paper Series 557, European Central Bank.
    19. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2009. "Purdah-On the Rationale for Central Bank Silence around Policy Meetings," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 517-528, March.
    20. Berlemann, Michael & Hilscher, Kai, 2010. "Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries," HWWI Research Papers 2-21, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    21. Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph, 2011. "Computation of LQ Approximations to Optimal Policy Problems in Different Information Settings under Zero Lower Bound Constraints," Dynare Working Papers 10, CEPREMAP.
    22. Berlemann, Michael & Hielscher, Kai, 2009. "Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism," Working Paper 89/2009, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    23. Anton Nakov, 2008. "Optimal and Simple Monetary Policy Rules with Zero Floor on the Nominal Interest Rate," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(2), pages 73-127, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    BCE; discours;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01089003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.