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Un modèle d'estimation de la valeur des lots de bois à partir de résultats d'enchères avec invendus

Author

Listed:
  • Raphaële Preget

    (LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)

  • Patrick Waelbroeck

Abstract

L'estimation de la valeur des bois sur pied est un sujet important pour les services forestiers nationaux afin qu'ils puissent fixer un prix de retrait pertinent et obtenir un juste prix. La méthode des prix hédonistes est particulièrement adaptée à l'évaluation des lots de bois sur pied, car de nombreuses caractéristiques en influencent le prix. Nous proposons un modèle d'estimation à partir des résultats d'enchères de bois de l'Office National des Forêts (ONF). Cependant, de nombreux lots restent invendus à l'issu de ces ventes. En outre, le prix de retrait n'est pas annoncé. Nous corrigeons le biais dû à la présence d'invendus grâce au modèle de sélection de Heckman et nous étudions les variables qui déterminent la probabilité de vente d'un lot ainsi que le prix implicite des caractéristiques des lots.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaële Preget & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2005. "Un modèle d'estimation de la valeur des lots de bois à partir de résultats d'enchères avec invendus," Post-Print hal-01072444, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01072444
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gerard Marty & Raphaele Preget, 2007. "A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2007-03, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA.
    2. Dossè Mawussi DJAHINI-AFAWOUBO, 2023. "Niveau d’éducation et probabilité d’être employé dans le secteur informel au Togo," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 57, pages 29-48.
    3. Elyakime, B. & Cabanettes, A., 2009. "How to improve the marketing of timber in France?," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 169-173, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ENCHERES DE BOIS; PRIX HEDONISTES; INVENDUS;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C24 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models; Threshold Regression Models
    • L73 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Forest Products
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry

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