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Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?

Author

Listed:
  • Itzhak Gilboa

    (TAU - Tel Aviv University)

  • David Schmeidler

    (OSU - The Ohio State University [Columbus])

Abstract

This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1988. "Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense Be Common Knowledge?," Post-Print hal-00753242, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00753242
    DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009. "Dynamic psychological games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January.
    2. Laurence Kranich & Joan Esteban, 2002. "A Theory of Endogenous Sentiments," Discussion Papers 02-11, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    3. Itzhak Gilboa, 1991. "Rationality and Ascriptive Science," Discussion Papers 943, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2021. "Privacy, Patience, and Protection," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 759-784, December.
    5. Dufwenberg, Martin & Patel, Amrish, 2019. "Introduction to special issue on psychological game theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 181-184.
    6. Marc Le Menestrel, 2003. "A one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma with procedural utility," Economics Working Papers 819, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "A psychological game with interdependent preference types," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000511, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "Intentions and Social Interactions," Working Papers 0602, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    9. ATTANASI Giuseppe & NAGEL Rosemarie, 2008. "A Survey of Psychological Games: Theoretical Findings and Experimental Evidence," LERNA Working Papers 08.07.251, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    10. Gradwohl, Ronen & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017. "Perception games and privacy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 293-308.
    11. Steven J. Brams, 1997. "Game Theory And Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 91-124, February.
    12. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    13. Christian Schmidt, 2006. "Quelques points de rencontre entre économistes et psychologues," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(2), pages 242-257.
    14. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "A Psychological Game with Interdependent Preference Types," CESifo Working Paper Series 1824, CESifo.
    15. Itzhak Gilboa, 1993. "Can Free Choice Be Known?," Discussion Papers 1055, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "Intentions and Social Interactions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1757, CESifo.
    17. John Geanakoplos, 1996. "The Hangman's Paradox and Newcomb's Paradox as Psychological Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1128, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    18. Itzhak Gilboa, 1989. "A Note on the Consistency of Game Theory," Discussion Papers 847, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    19. Stanley Reiter, 2001. "Interdependent Preferences and Groups of Agents," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(1), pages 27-67, January.
    20. Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin, 2016. "Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(2), pages 279-308, August.
    21. Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard, 2020. "Enabling reciprocity through blockchain design," IFRO Working Paper 2020/14, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, revised 09 Feb 2021.
    22. Barry Sopher, 1994. "Concession Behavior in a Bargaining Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(1), pages 117-137, March.
    23. Iñarra García, María Elena & Laruelle, Annick & Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2012. "Games with perceptions," IKERLANAK 9099, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.

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