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Auctions and shareholdings

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  • David Ettinger

    (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two types of shareholdings are analyzed: Vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds cover situations in which bidders own a fraction of the seller's profit (resp: a share of their competitor's profit). Expected revenue is an increasing (resp: decreasing) function of vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds. With both types of toeholds, auction formats are not revenue equivalent. Expected revenue is affected to a greater extent by the presence of toeholds in the second price auction than in the first-price auction.

Suggested Citation

  • David Ettinger, 2008. "Auctions and shareholdings," Post-Print hal-00701303, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00701303
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00701303
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pitchik, Carolyn & Schotter, Andrew, 1986. "Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions," Working Papers 86-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Silvester van Koten, 2006. "Bidding Behavior when One Bidder and the Auctioneer Are Vertically Integrated Implications for the Partial Deregulation of EU Electricity Markets," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp313, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    2. Ettinger, David, 2003. "Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 1-7, July.
    3. Björn Bartling & Tobias Gesche & Nick Netzer, 2017. "Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(1), pages 44-61, July.
    4. Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Optimal and efficient takeover contests with toeholds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 203-216.
    5. David Ettinger, 2009. "Takeover Contests, Toeholds and Deterrence," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 103-124, March.
    6. Bartling, Björn & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "An externality-robust auction: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 186-204.
    7. Kyle Bagwell & Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, 2003. "The Case for Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO," NBER Working Papers 9920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    9. Loyola, Gino, 2008. "Optimal takeover contests with toeholds," UC3M Working papers. Economics we083217, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    10. Loyola, Gino, 2007. "How to sell to buyers with crossholdings," UC3M Working papers. Economics we075025, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    11. van Koten, Silvester, 2012. "Merchant interconnector projects by generators in the EU: Profitability and allocation of capacity," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 748-758.
    12. Gino Loyola, 2021. "Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 1-32, June.
    13. Bagwell, Kyle & Mavroidis, Petros C. & Staiger, Robert W., 2007. "Auctioning countermeasures in the WTO," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 309-332, November.
    14. Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Auctions vs. negotiations in takeovers with initial stakes," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 111-120.
    15. Bagwell, Kyle & Mavroidis, Petros C. & Staiger, Robert W., 2004. "The case for tradable remedies in WTO dispute settlement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3314, The World Bank.

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