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Small perturbations and stochastic games

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Vieille

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The purpose of this note is to apply results from the theory of Markov chains with rare transitions to stochastic games. The results obtained here are used in the proof of existence of equilibrium payoffs in two-player stochastic games.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Vieille, 2000. "Small perturbations and stochastic games," Post-Print hal-00481409, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00481409
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02810665
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Samuel Simon, 2012. "A Topological Approach to Quitting Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(1), pages 180-195, February.
    2. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2022. "Costless delay in negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 69-93, July.
    3. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Rabah Amir & Igor V. Evstigneev & Valeriya Potapova, 2021. "Unbeatable Strategies," Economics Discussion Paper Series 2101, Economics, The University of Manchester, revised Jul 2023.
    5. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 362-399, February.
    6. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "Perturbed Markov Chains," Discussion Papers 1342, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    stochastic games; small perturbations;

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