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Collusion dans les enchères: quelques apports de jeux coopératifs

Author

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  • Francoise Forges

    (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Riham Barbar

Abstract

We consider the second price sealed bid auction of an object that the potential buyers value privately and independently. We show that a cartel?s ex ante optimum, subject to incentive compatility and ex post balanced transfers, coincides with the first best and defines a supermodular characteristic function. By using two standard solution concepts, the core and the Shapley value, we show, among other properties, that every cartel is stable and that bidders gain in forming cartels whose size is as large as possible. We illustrate the difficulties to extend our results in the context of common values. Classification JEL : C71, D44.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Francoise Forges & Riham Barbar, 2007. "Collusion dans les enchères: quelques apports de jeux coopératifs," Post-Print hal-00360742, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00360742
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    Cited by:

    1. Forges, Françoise & Orzach, Ram, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 760-767.
    2. Omer Biran, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," Working Papers halshs-00608008, HAL.
    3. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7891 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4100 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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