IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00300388.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How Compatible is Perfect Competition with Transmission Loss Allocation Methods?

Author

Listed:
  • Jing Dai

    (SUPELEC-Campus Gif - Ecole Supérieure d'Electricité - SUPELEC (FRANCE))

  • Yannick Phulpin

    (SUPELEC-Campus Gif - Ecole Supérieure d'Electricité - SUPELEC (FRANCE))

  • Vincent Rious

    (SUPELEC-Campus Gif - Ecole Supérieure d'Electricité - SUPELEC (FRANCE))

  • Damien Ernst

    (Université de Liège)

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of transmission loss allocation in a power system where the generators, the demands and the system operator are independent. We suppose that the transmission losses are exclusively charged to the generators, which are willing to adopt a perfectly competitive behavior. In this context, their offers must reflect their production costs and their transmission loss costs, the latter being unknown beforehand and having to be predicted. We assume in this paper that the generators predict their loss costs from the past observations by using a weighted average of their past allocated costs. Under those assumptions, we simulate the market dynamics for different types of transmission loss allocation methods. The results show that the transmission loss allocation scheme can lead to a poorly efficient market in terms of social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Jing Dai & Yannick Phulpin & Vincent Rious & Damien Ernst, 2008. "How Compatible is Perfect Competition with Transmission Loss Allocation Methods?," Post-Print hal-00300388, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00300388
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://centralesupelec.hal.science/hal-00300388
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://centralesupelec.hal.science/hal-00300388/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vernon L. Smith, 1994. "Economics in the Laboratory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 113-131, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gabriele Camera & Cary Deck & David Porter, 2020. "Do economic inequalities affect long-run cooperation and prosperity?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 53-83, March.
    2. Deck, Cary & Murphy, James J., 2019. "Donors change both their level and pattern of giving in response to contests among charities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 91-106.
    3. Cary Deck & Erik O. Kimbrough, 2017. "Experimenting with Contests for Experimentation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 391-406, October.
    4. Cary Deck & Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker, 2013. "An examination of the effect of messages on cooperation under double-blind and single-blind payoff procedures," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 597-607, December.
    5. Ackert, Lucy F. & Church, Bryan K. & Zhang, Ping, 2004. "Asset prices and informed traders' abilities: Evidence from experimental asset markets," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 609-626, October.
    6. Zizzo, Daniel John, 2013. "Claims and confounds in economic experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 186-195.
    7. Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2017. "Referenda Under Oath," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 479-504, July.
    8. Roy Chen & Yan Chen & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2021. "Best practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(1), pages 2-30, March.
    9. Dwenger, Nadja & Lohse, Tim, 2019. "Do individuals successfully cover up their lies? Evidence from a compliance experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 74-87.
    10. Hermann Garbers, "undated". "Agents' Rationality and the CHF/USD Exchange Rate, Part II," IEW - Working Papers 169, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    11. Tian, Ye & Li, Yudi & Sun, Jian, 2022. "Stick or carrot for traffic demand management? Evidence from experimental economics," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 235-254.
    12. Morten Søberg, 2002. "The Duhem-Quine thesis and experimental economics. A reinterpretation," Discussion Papers 329, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    13. Bosley, Stacie, 2016. "Student-crafted experiments “from the ground up”," International Review of Economics Education, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 1-7.
    14. Schnizler, Björn & Neumann, Dirk & Veit, Daniel & Napoletano, Mauro & Catalano, Michele & Gallegati, Mauro & Reinicke, Michael & Streitberger, Werner & Eymann, Torsten, 2005. "Environmental analysis for application layer networks," Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management 1, University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management.
    15. Porter, David & Rassenti, Stephen & Shobe, William & Smith, Vernon & Winn, Abel, 2009. "The design, testing and implementation of Virginia's NOx allowance auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 190-200, February.
    16. Gabriele Camera & Cary Deck & David Porter, 2016. "Do Economic Inequalities Affect Long-Run Cooperation?," Working Papers 16-18, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    17. Cornand, Camille & Erazo Diaz, Maria Alejandra & Zylbersztejn, Adam, 2023. "Trading and cognition in asset markets: An eye-tracking experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 711-732.
    18. Matthew W. McCarter & Abel M. Winn, 2013. "When the Economics of a Decision Matters More than the Psychology of the Decision: Understanding the Economic Significance of Auction Fever," Working Papers 13-19, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    19. Douglas Davis, 2016. "Experimental Methods for the General Economist: Five Lessons from the Lab," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(4), pages 1046-1058, April.
    20. Lester G Telser, 2001. "The Ultimatum Game and the Law of Demand," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000150, David K. Levine.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00300388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.