French professional football: how much different?

18.1 INTRODUCTION France, in common with other leading European football nations, was affected by two significant economic shocks in the 1990s. One was the globalisation of the labour market for football players which occurred after the Bosman case in 1995; the other was a substantial change in the format and financial endowment of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) club competitions, accelerated by the failed attempt by Media-Partners in 1999 to create a European Super-League. How has French professional football adjusted to this double shock since 2000? Did French football adjust better or worse than the other major European leagues to the changing financial realities of professional football at the highest level? Many French sports analysts are inclined to cite the French Ligue 1 (FL1) as the best-managed football league in Europe. It is suggested that the French exception copes better than others with football's financial pressures. This exception has been praised as a virtuous example for other European major football leagues such as the English Premier League (EPL), Italian Lega Calcio (ILC), Spanish Liga de Futbol (SLF) and German Bundesliga (GBL). Some French official reports went as far as to recommend making a rule out of this exception by extending it to all leagues under UEFA's jurisdiction (Collin, 2004; Denis, 2003). Another report more modestly questions the preconditions for French football clubs to become both more competitive on the pitch, and economically sound (Besson, 2008). The claimed advantages of the French model may have been influential in informing the thinking underlying the UEFA Financial Fair Play rules. The French model, however, is not universally admired throughout Europe, especially in the countries with the most powerful football leagues. There are at least three criticisms. First, it is argued that relatively weak sporting performance at the European level is the price paid for sound financial management. An extreme variant of this argument, often voiced abroad, is that the French football authorities focus on sound finance to the detriment of sporting performance. Second, smaller deficits and debts may be more an index of the French clubs' lack of competitiveness than an example of exemplary management. Third, in some countries (for example, the UK, Ireland and the Czech Republic), the French football league and economy are considered to be too heavily regulated , to the detriment of both competitiveness and the level of sporting performance. Rather than dismiss such views out of hand as belonging to the realm of caricature, this chapter considers whether they contain any grain of truth, and searches for a balanced response. Section 18.2 begins with an assessment of French football sporting and financial performance. Section 18.3 examines the inputs mobilised for attaining such performance , in order to evaluate in section 18.4 the efficiency of professional football clubs in France. Against the background of a typically optimistic financial self-assessment on the part of French football clubs, section 18.5 examines the sources and structure of French professional football: how much different? 299 professional football finance, as well as the role of the league's auditing body. Section 18.6 presents a more personal analysis, stressing the football clubs' soft budget constraint and a vicious circle between the increasing commercial value of TV broadcasting rights, and skyrocketing club payrolls. Section 18.7 concludes by drawing some brief conclusions about the future of French professional football. 18.2 A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FINANCIAL AND SPORTING PERFORMANCE?