IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cesptp/halshs-00305484.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Aid Allocation: comparing donors' behaviours

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Claude Berthélemy

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper synthesises previous findings on bilateral aid allocation behaviours and compares them with multilateral agency behaviours. It shows that self-interest motives predominate developmental motives in bilateral aid allocation decisions, save for Switzerland and a few Nordic donors. The influence of commercial interests plays a major role in this respect and has a much higher quantitative influence on aid allocation than geopolitical motives. Among developmental motives, recipients' needs play a significant role, together with political governance. Bilateral aid allocation is also influenced by multilateral aid flows. Among multilateral donors, the European Commission (EC) has a quite specific behaviour, with a small role played by recipients' needs and merits, and a strong bias in favour of ACP countries. Conversely, multilateral aid, excluding EC's assistance, strongly responds to recipients' needs. Significant influences of US and Japanese commercial interests on multilateral aid decisions, and of British commercial interests on EC's aid, are also detected

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Claude Berthélemy, 2006. "Aid Allocation: comparing donors' behaviours," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00305484, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00305484
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Weiler, Florian & Klöck, Carola & Dornan, Matthew, 2018. "Vulnerability, good governance, or donor interests? The allocation of aid for climate change adaptation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 65-77.
    2. Florian Weiler, 2019. "Adaptation and Health: Are Countries with More Climate-Sensitive Health Sectors More Likely to Receive Adaptation Aid?," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(8), pages 1-16, April.
    3. Molenaers, Nadia & Dellepiane, Sebastian & Faust, Jorg, 2015. "Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 2-12.
    4. Wako, Hassen, 2016. "Aid, institutions and economic growth: Heterogeneous parameters and heterogeneous donors," MERIT Working Papers 2016-009, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    5. Degol Hailu & Admasu Shiferaw, 2012. "Macroeconomic Determinants of Exit from Aid-Dependence," Working Papers 90, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.
    6. Iliana Olivié & Aitor Pérez, 2016. "Why don’t donor countries coordinate their aid? A case study of European donors in Morocco," Progress in Development Studies, , vol. 16(1), pages 52-64, January.
    7. Molenaers, N. & Gagiano, A. & Smets, L. & Dellepiane, S., 2015. "What Determines the Suspension of Budget Support?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 62-73.
    8. Hartmann, Simon, 2011. "Geberverhalten in der internationalen Entwicklungspolitik: Schwierigkeiten beim Umgang mit dem Spannungsfeld Rechenschaftspflichten," Working Papers 26, Austrian Foundation for Development Research (ÖFSE).
    9. Bernhard Reinsberg, 2019. "Do Countries Use Foreign Aid to Buy Geopolitical Influence? Evidence from Donor Campaigns for Temporary UN Security Council Seats," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 7(2), pages 127-154.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00305484. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.