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Payment schemes in random-termination experimental games

Author

Listed:
  • Katerina Sherstyuk

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

  • Nori Tarui

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa and University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization)

  • Majah-Leah Ravago

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    (Osaka University)

Abstract

We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last-period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last-period payment is also robust under different attitudes towards risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. Experimentally, we find that the cumulative payment appears the best in inducing long-sighted behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Katerina Sherstyuk & Nori Tarui & Majah-Leah Ravago & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2011. "Payment schemes in random-termination experimental games," Working Papers 2011-9, University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
    • Handle: RePEc:hae:wpaper:2011-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Masaki Aoyagi & V. Bhaskar & Guillaume R. Fréchette, 2019. "The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 1-43, February.
    2. Katerina Sherstyuk & Nori Tarui & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2013. "Payment schemes in infinite-horizon experimental games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(1), pages 125-153, March.
    3. Hample, Kelsey C, 2020. "Experimental methodology: Assigning pro-social groups in the lab," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 88(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic experiments; infinite-horizon games; random termination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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