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Adaptive governance: the role of loyalty

Author

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  • Klos, Tomas B.
  • Nooteboom, Bart

    (Groningen University)

Abstract

Many organization theories consist of an interpretation frame and an idea about the ideal equilibrium state. This article explains how the equilibrium concept is used in four organization theories: the theories of Fayol, Mintzberg, Morgan, and Volberda. Equilibrium can be defined as balance, fit or requisite variety. Equilibrium is related to observables dependent on the definition of organization as work organization, formal organization or artifact organization. Equilibrium can be explicitly related to performance in the theory used, enabling cross-sectional research. The discussed theories can be mapped on a state space model in a way that clarifies the equilibrium concept, namely a mu-space (Fayol and Morgan), or a gamma-space (Mintzberg and Volberda). 1 Prof.dr. Henk W.M. Gazendam is professor of Information Systems in the Public Sector at the Faculty of Public Administration at Twente University and associate professor of Information Strategy at the Faculty of Management and Organization at Groningen University (P.O.Box 800, NL-9700-AV Groningen, The Netherlands, tel +31-50-3637078, email h.w.m.gazendam@bdk.rug.nl). 2 Contribution to the Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory Workshop, May 3 and 4, 1996, Washington Hilton & Towers. 3 The author wishes to thank Vincent Homburg for his valuable comments.

Suggested Citation

  • Klos, Tomas B. & Nooteboom, Bart, 1997. "Adaptive governance: the role of loyalty," Research Report 97B53, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    • Handle: RePEc:gro:rugsom:97b53
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gerard Weisbuch & Alan Kirman & Dorothea Herreiner, 1995. "Market Organization," Working Papers 95-11-102, Santa Fe Institute.
    2. Tomas Klos, "undated". "Decentralized Interaction and Co-adaptation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Computing in Economics and Finance 1997 88, Society for Computational Economics.
    3. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-261, October.
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