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Coattail effects and electoral coordination

Author

Listed:
  • Ignacio Lago
  • Marina Costa Lobo
  • Santiago Lago-Peñas

Abstract

In this paper we challenge the conventional wisdom about the political consequences of electoral systems. We show that the psychological effects of an electoral system manifest themselves in founding elections in those countries in which there are coattail effects running from the more important to the less important offices. The artificial deflationary pressures induced by coattail effects make the psychological effects of electoral systems in elections for less important offices increase coordination failures after the founding election. The empirical evidence comes from district-level data in legislative, regional and European elections in five countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Lago & Marina Costa Lobo & Santiago Lago-Peñas, 2016. "Coattail effects and electoral coordination," Working Papers. Collection B: Regional and sectoral economics 1603, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
    • Handle: RePEc:gov:wpregi:1603
    as

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    File URL: http://infogen.webs.uvigo.es/WPB/WP1603.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Duch, Raymond M. & Palmer, Harvey D., 2002. "Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 63-91, January.
    2. Blais, André & Carty, R. K., 1991. "The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 79-93, January.
    3. Gunther, Richard, 1989. "Electoral Laws, Party Systems, and Elites: The Case of Spain," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 835-858, September.
    4. Matt Golder, 2006. "Presidential Coattails and Legislative Fragmentation," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(1), pages 34-48, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coattail effects; disproportionality; electoral systems; psychological effects; wasted votes.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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