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Decentralization and governance in Europe: Evidence from different expenditure components

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  • Andreas P. Kyriacou
  • Oriol Roca Sagalés

Abstract

In this article, we consider the impact of fiscal decentralization on government quality by way of disaggregated measures of the former. Specifically, we break down fiscal decentralization into sub-central expenditure on public procurement and compensation of public sector employees. We find that decentralizing public procurement is bad for government performance while the decentralization of public sector wages improves governance. We relate the negative effect to the rent-seeking activity of interest groups and the positive effect to the informational advantage of sub-central provision. Moreover, we explore the impact of the Great Recession on our results and find that it is associated with stronger negative and positive effects of decentralization on governance, something which is consistent with the observed increased in the degree of decentralization since 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas P. Kyriacou & Oriol Roca Sagalés, 2018. "Decentralization and governance in Europe: Evidence from different expenditure components," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 1802, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
    • Handle: RePEc:gov:wpaper:1802
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal decentralization; public procurement; public service provision; good governance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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