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Fault Tolerant Implementation

Author

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  • Eliaz, K.

Abstract

n this paper we investigate the implementation problem arising when some of the players are ``faulty" in the sense that they fail to act optimally. The exact number and identity of the faulty players is unknown to the planner and to the nonfaulty players, but it is common knowledge that there are at most k faulty players. We define a solution concept which requires a player to optimally respond to the nonfaulty players regardless of the identity and actions of the faulty players. We introduce a notion of fault-tolerant implementation, which unlike standard notions of full implementation, also requires robustness to deviations from the equilibrium. The main result of this paper establishes that under symmetric information any choice rule that satisfies two properties - k+1 monotonicity and no veto power - can be implemented by a strategic game form if there are at least three players and the number of faulty players is less than 1/2n-1. For exchange economies we show that the Walrasian correspondence and the core correspondence are implementable. As an application of our result we present examples of simple mechanisms that implement the constrained Walrasian function and a choice rule for the efficient allocation of an indivisible good.

Suggested Citation

  • Eliaz, K., 1999. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Papers 21-99, Tel Aviv.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:21-99
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2003. "A computer scientist looks at game theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 114-131, October.
    2. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2014. "Behavioral Implementation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 2975-3002, October.
    4. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
    5. Antonio Cabrales & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Implemetation in Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics," Working Papers wp2007_0708, CEMFI.
    6. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288, Elsevier.
    7. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    8. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
    9. Saran, Rene, 2011. "Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1712-1720, July.
    10. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2012. "A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(6), pages 1057-1082.
    11. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    12. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    SOCIAL CHOICE ; POLITICS;

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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