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Technical Efficiency Under Alternative Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from the Inter-War Britich Gas Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Hammond, C.J.
  • Jones, G.
  • Robinson, T.

Abstract

From 1920 until nationalisation, privately owned gas companies in Britain were regulated under one of three systems: the Maximum Price, the Sliding Scale, or the Basic Price system. In effect, the industry was the subject of a remarkable experiment in regulation. Hitherto, there has been no empirical analysis of the incentive properties of the regimes applied. This paper attempts such an investigation by using Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate the relative efficiency of a sample of undertakings under each system. Undertakings operating under the basic price system are found to be more efficient which suggests that incentive regulation was effective in the industry at this time.

Suggested Citation

  • Hammond, C.J. & Jones, G. & Robinson, T., 2000. "Technical Efficiency Under Alternative Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from the Inter-War Britich Gas Industry," Papers 280, Universite de Nantes - Economie Internationale et de l'Entreprise.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:nantie:280
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    Cited by:

    1. Jamasb, Tooraj & Pollitt, Michael, 2007. "Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: Lessons of experience from Britain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6163-6187, December.
    2. Jamasb, T. & Söderberg, M., 2009. "Yardstick and Ex-post Regulation by Norm Model: Empirical Equivalence, Pricing Effect, and Performance in Sweeden," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0908, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Malcolm Abbott, 2013. "The Motivation and Effectiveness of Gas Industry Economic Regulation in New South Wales, 1912–39," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 53(2), pages 167-186, July.
    4. Gugler, Klaus & Liebensteiner, Mario, 2016. "Productivity Growth and the General X-factor in Austria´s Gas Distribution," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 236, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    5. Tooraj Jamasb & Magnus Söderberg, 2010. "The Effects of Average Norm Model Regulation: The Case of Electricity Distribution in Sweden," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(3), pages 249-269, May.
    6. Gugler, Klaus & Liebensteiner, Mario, 2019. "Productivity growth and incentive regulation in Austria's gas distribution," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    7. Uri, Noel D., 2003. "The adoption of incentive regulation and its effect on technical efficiency in telecommunications in the United States," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 21-34, October.
    8. Malcolm Abbott & Xiaoying Ma, 2017. "Economic Regulation in Australia: The Case of the New South Wales Gas," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 36(3), pages 250-265, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    NATURAL GAS ; REGULATION ; PRICING;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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