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Benefits-Cost Analysis and Distortionary Taxes: A Public Choice Approach

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  • Bergstrom, T.

Abstract

This paper seeks useful conditions relating individual preferences to willingness to support specific governmental tax-expenditure proposals. This discussion follows Wicksell in considering only tax-expenditure proposals that specifically tie expenditures to taxes that finance them.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Bergstrom, T., 1993. "Benefits-Cost Analysis and Distortionary Taxes: A Public Choice Approach," Papers 93-31, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:michet:93-31
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. J. E. Stiglitz & P. Dasgupta, 1971. "Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 151-174.
    2. A. B. Atkinson & N. H. Stern, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(1), pages 119-128.
    3. Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    4. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-278, June.
    5. Abram Burk, 1938. "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 52(2), pages 310-334.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic theory ; competition;

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H - Public Economics

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