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Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities

Author

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  • Chang, H.F.

Abstract

Dispute-settlement panels of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as well as the GATT Secretariat, have condemned the use of trade restrictions by some countries to induce other countries to protect the global environment. The GATT Secretariat has recommended that countries rely on "carrots" rather than "sticks"to induce the participation of other countries in multilateral environmental agreements. This article presents a formal model of a signaling game the indicates that the type of "carrots only" regime suggested by the GATT Secretariat would create perverse incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Chang, H.F., 1997. "Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities," Papers 97-13, Georgetown University Law Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:geolaw:97-13
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rodney D. Ludema & Taizo Takeno, 2007. "Tariffs and the adoption of clean technology under asymmetric information," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(4), pages 1100-1117, November.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4069 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. M. Fabbri & P. N. Barbieri & M. Bigoni, 2016. "Ride Your Luck! A Field Experiment on Lottery-based Incentives for Compliance," Working Papers wp1089, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    4. Runge, C. Ford, 2001. "A Global Environment Organization (Geo) And The World Trading System: Prospects And Problems," Working Papers 14448, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
    5. Tian, Ye & Li, Yudi & Sun, Jian, 2022. "Stick or carrot for traffic demand management? Evidence from experimental economics," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 235-254.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    INTERNATIONAL TRADE;

    JEL classification:

    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade

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