Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives
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- Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
References listed on IDEAS
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