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Controlling Risk Selction Incentives when Health Insurance Contracts are Endogenous

Author

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  • Jack, W.

Abstract

The paper examines the nature of health insurance contracts when insurance companies are forced to pool high and low risk individuals. Insureres have an incentive to design contracts so as to attract only better brisks, and equilibrium contracts are generally characterised by less coevrage and lower cost-reducing effort on the part of the insurer than in the absence of these incentives. Public transfers positively related to claims tend to increase coverage but reduce effort, si the optimal transfer rate may be positive or negative.

Suggested Citation

  • Jack, W., 1998. "Controlling Risk Selction Incentives when Health Insurance Contracts are Endogenous," Papers 341, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:aunaec:341
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    Cited by:

    1. Jack, William, 2006. "Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 908-926, September.
    2. William Jack(Georgetown University), 2004. "Optimal risk adjustment in a model with adverse selection and spatial competition," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-15, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Jack, William, 2000. "Health insurance reform in four Latin American countries : theory and practice," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2492, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    RISK ; HEALTH INSURANCE;

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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