IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fpr/ifprid/1174.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The dynamics of insurance demand under liquidity constraints and insurer default risk:

Author

Listed:
  • Liu, Yanyan
  • Myers, Robert

Abstract

Low demand for micro-insurance has been a prominent problem in developing countries. We study the dynamics of insurance demand by risk-averse farmers who can borrow and lend subject to a credit constraint and who also perceive a risk of insurer default. Credit constraints and the possibility of insurer default both reduce the demand for insurance. We then propose an alternative insurance design that allows farmers to enter an insurance contract while delaying payment of the premium until the end of the insured period. We show how this alternative design can increase insurance take-up by relaxing the liquidity constraint and assuaging farmers’ concerns about insurer default. We also investigate the effects of the associated problem of farmers reneging on their delayed premium payment if the insured event does not occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Yanyan & Myers, Robert, 2012. "The dynamics of insurance demand under liquidity constraints and insurer default risk:," IFPRI discussion papers 1174, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    • Handle: RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1174
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp01174.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xavier Giné & Robert Townsend & James Vickery, 2008. "Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural India," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 22(3), pages 539-566, October.
    2. Helge Braun & Winfried Koeniger, 2007. "On the role of market insurance in a dynamic model," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 32(1), pages 61-90, June.
    3. Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
    4. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Timothy Besley & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1994. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 491-515.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jensen, Nathaniel D. & Mude, Andrew G. & Barrett, Christopher B., 2018. "How basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection influence demand for index insurance: Evidence from northern Kenya," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 172-198.
    2. Michael King & Anuj Pratab Singh, 2018. "Understanding farmers' valuation of agricultural insurance: Evidence from Vietnam," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-93, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Burren, Daniel, 2013. "Insurance demand and welfare-maximizing risk capital—Some hints for the regulator in the case of exponential preferences and exponential claims," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 551-568.
    4. Anuj Singh & Michael King, 2018. "Understanding farmers’ valuation of agricultural insurance: Evidence from Vietnam," WIDER Working Paper Series 93, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. King, Michael & Singh, Anuj Pratap, 2020. "Understanding farmers’ valuation of agricultural insurance: Evidence from Vietnam," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yanyan Liu & Robert J. Myers, 2016. "The Dynamics Of Microinsurance Demand In Developing Countries Under Liquidity Constraints And Insurer Default Risk," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 121-138, January.
    2. Li Gan & Manuel A. Hernandez & Yanyan Liu, 2018. "Group Lending With Heterogeneous Types," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 895-913, April.
    3. Beatriz Armendáriz & Ariane Szafarz, 2011. "On Mission Drift in Microfinance Institutions," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Beatriz Armendáriz & Marc Labie (ed.), The Handbook Of Microfinance, chapter 16, pages 341-366, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Columba, Francesco & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2010. "Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-54, April.
    5. Dean S. Karlan, 2005. "Social Capital and Group Banking," Working Papers 181, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies..
    6. Joel M. Guttman, 2006. "Repayment Performance in Group Lending Programs: A Survey," NFI Working Papers 2006-WP-01, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    7. Columba, Francesco & Leonardo, Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio, Mistrulli, 2008. "Firms as monitor of other firms: mutual guarantee institutions and SME finance," MPRA Paper 14032, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Lensink, Robert & Eijkel, Remco van & Hermes, Niels, 2007. "Group lending and the role of the group leader:Theory and evidence from Eritrea," Research Report 07004, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    9. Holger M. Mueller, 2000. "Project Bundling, Liquidity Spillovers, and Capital Market Discipline," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0681, Econometric Society.
    10. Daripa, Arup, 2008. "Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 147-163, April.
    11. Peter Werner, 2010. "The Dynamics of Cooperation in Group Lending - A Microfinance Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 49, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    12. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
    13. repec:dgr:rugsom:07004 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Loic Sadoulet, 2002. "Incorporating Insurance Provisions in Microfinance Contracts: Learning from Visa®?," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-56, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    15. Hermes, Niels & Lensink, Robert & Mehrteab, Habteab T., 2005. "Peer Monitoring, Social Ties and Moral Hazard in Group Lending Programs: Evidence from Eritrea," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 149-169, January.
    16. Simon Cornée & David Masclet, 2013. "Long-Term Relationships, Group lending and Peer Sanctioning in Microfinance: New Experimental Evidence," Working Papers CEB 13-026, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    17. repec:dgr:rugsom:03e36 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Robert Cull & Asli Demirguç-Kunt & Jonathan Morduch, 2007. "Financial performance and outreach: a global analysis of leading microbanks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages 107-133, February.
    19. Shyamal Chowdhury & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Discussion Papers 14-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    20. Al-Azzam, Moh'd & Carter Hill, R. & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2012. "Repayment performance in group lending: Evidence from Jordan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 404-414.
    21. Alessandra Cassar & Lucas Crowley & Bruce Wydick, 2005. "The effect of social capital on group loan repayment: Evidence from artefactual field experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 00036, The Field Experiments Website.
    22. DeanS. Karlan, 2007. "Social connections and group banking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages 52-84, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insurance; Agricultural; delayed premium payment; insurance demand; liquidity constraint; insurer default;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1174. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifprius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.