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Repo over the Financial Crisis

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Abstract

This paper uses new data to provide a comprehensive view of repo activity during the 2007-09 financial crisis for the first time. We show that activity declined much more in the bilateral segment of the market than in the tri-party segment. Surprisingly, we find that a large share of the decline in activity is driven by repos backed by Treasury securities. Further, a disproportionate share of the decline in repo activity is connected to securities dealer’s market-making activity in Treasury securities. In particular, the evidence suggests that at least part of the decline is not driven by clients pulling away from securities dealers because of counterparty credit concerns.

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  • Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin, 2021. "Repo over the Financial Crisis," Staff Reports 996, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:93506
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Viktoria Baklanova & Cecilia Caglio & Frank Keane & Burt Porter, 2016. "A Pilot Survey of Agent Securities Lending Activity," Working Papers 16-08, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    2. Darrell, Duffie, 2010. "The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 131-153.
    3. Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin & Michael Walker, 2010. "The tri-party repo market before the 2010 reforms," Staff Reports 477, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
    5. Bengt Holmstrom, 2015. "Understanding the role of debt in the financial system," BIS Working Papers 479, Bank for International Settlements.
    6. David Musto & Greg Nini & Krista Schwarz, 2018. "Notes on Bonds: Illiquidity Feedback During the Financial Crisis," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(8), pages 2983-3018.
    7. Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2010. "How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned in the Crisis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    8. Sriya Anbil & Zeynep Senyuz, 2018. "The Regulatory and Monetary Policy Nexus in the Repo Market," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-027, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    9. Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick & Chase P. Ross, 2020. "Who Ran on Repo?," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 110, pages 487-492, May.
    10. Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin & Michael Walker, 2014. "Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2343-2380, December.
    11. Mr. Manmohan Singh, 2011. "Velocity of Pledged Collateral: Analysis and Implications," IMF Working Papers 2011/256, International Monetary Fund.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    repo; financial crisis; money markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System

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