Understanding the role of debt in the financial system
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More about this item
Keywords
financial crisis; liquidity; money markets; shadow banking; debt; information sensitivity; pawn shops; bailouts; banking regulation;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2015-01-26 (Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2015-01-26 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-FMK-2015-01-26 (Financial Markets)
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