A Model of Participatory Democracy: Undestanding the Case of Porto Alegre
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Enriqueta Aragones & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "A Model of Participatory Democracy: Understanding the Case of Porto Alegre," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 124, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
References listed on IDEAS
- Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, 2001. "Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance," Politics & Society, , vol. 29(1), pages 5-41, March.
- Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1989.
"Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(2), pages 373-398, June.
- Alberto Alesina & Howard Rosenthal, 1988. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," NBER Working Papers 2706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rosenthal, Howard & Alesina, Alberto, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," Scholarly Articles 4553031, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1995.
"Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 769-798.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000.
"Meetings with Costly Participation,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September.
- Martin Osborne & Jeffry Rosenthal & Matthew A. Turner, 1998. "Meetings with costly participation," Working Papers mturner-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Pivato, Marcus, 2007. "Pyramidal Democracy," MPRA Paper 3965, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Aragonès, Enriqueta & Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago, 2009. "A theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of Porto Alegre," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 56-72, January.
- George Ward, 2015. "Is Happiness a Predictor of Election Results?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1343, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Schönenberger, Felix, 2024. "Out of Office, Out of Step? Re-election Concners and Ideological Shirking in Lame Duck Sessions of the U.S. House of Representatives," MPRA Paper 120159, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Le Borgne, Eric & Lockwood, Ben, 2000.
"Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
582, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Le Borgne, Eric & Lockwood, Ben, 2001. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," Economic Research Papers 269353, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Mr. Eric Le Borgne & Mr. Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle," IMF Working Papers 2002/048, International Monetary Fund.
- Ward, George, 2015. "Is happiness a predictor of election results?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61698, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Le Borgne, Eric & Lockwood, Ben, 2000.
"Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents?,"
Economic Research Papers
269351, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- le Borgne, E. & Lockwood, B., 2000. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 580, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Phongthorn Wrasai, 2005. "Politicians' Motivation, Role of Elections, and Policy Choices," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Margherita Negri, 2017. "Good Politicians' Distorted Incentives," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201713, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.
- Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Resource windfalls and public debt: A political economy perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
- Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Reelection, growth and public debt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2023. "Can resource windfalls reduce corruption? The role of term limits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
- Dalle Nogare, Chiara & Kauder, Björn, 2017.
"Term limits for mayors and intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Italian cities,"
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-11.
- Nogare, Chiara Dalle & Kauder, Björn, 2017. "Term limits for mayors and intergovernmental grants: Evidence from Italian cities," Munich Reprints in Economics 49908, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Takanori Adachi & Yoichi Hizen, 2014.
"Political Accountability, Electoral Control and Media Bias,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 316-343, September.
- Takanori Adachi & Yoichi Hizen, 2012. "Political Accountability, Electoral Control, and Media Bias," KIER Working Papers 811, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013.
"Term limits and electoral accountability,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
- Sturm, Daniel & Smart, Michael, 2004. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 4272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46860, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Michael Smart & Daniel M. Sturm, 2006. "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEP Discussion Papers dp0770, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2006. "Term limits and electoral accountability," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19771, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel, 2004. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Economic History Working Papers 20283, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2011.
"A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress,"
Working Papers
2072/151813, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress," MPRA Paper 29890, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011.
"Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
- Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2009. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chauvin, Juan Pablo & Tricaud, Clemence, 2022.
"Gender and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Crisis Response,"
IDB Publications (Working Papers)
12411, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Juan Pablo Chauvin & Clemence Tricaud, 2024. "Gender and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Crisis Response," NBER Working Papers 32410, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chauvin, Juan Pablo & Tricaud, Clemence, 2023. "Gender and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Crisis Response," CEPR Discussion Papers 17904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Umeno, Luis Gustavo & Bugarin, Maurício Soares, 2008. "Electoral Control in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 28(1), May.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2011.
"A political agency model of coattail voting,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1652-1660.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting," MPRA Paper 28800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting," Working Papers 2072/151618, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Veronica Grembi & Tommaso Nannicini & Ugo Troiano, 2011.
"Policy Responses to Fiscal Restraints: A Difference-in-Discontinuities Design,"
Working Papers
397, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Veronica Grembi & Tommaso Nannicini & Ugo Troiano, 2012. "Policy Responses to Fiscal Restraints: A Difference-in-Discontinuities Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 3999, CESifo.
- Grembi, Veronica & Nannicini, Tommaso & Troiano, Ugo, 2012. "Policy Responses to Fiscal Restraints: A Difference-in-Discontinuities Design," IZA Discussion Papers 6952, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
More about this item
Keywords
Participatory Democracy; Retrspective voting; assembly; Legislator;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:235. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bruno Guallar (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bargses.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.