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Government policy and banking instability: \"overbanking\" in the 1920s

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Abstract

Excess capacity, or ?overbanking,? was cited by contemporaries as leading cause of bank failure during the 1920s. Many states that had high numbers of banks per capita in 1920 had high bank failure rates subsequently. This article finds that the number of banks per capita was highest in states that provided deposit insurance, set low minimum capital requirements, and restricted branching. Banks per capita declined the most over the 1920s in states where branching expanded, and in those suffering high failure rates because of falling incomes or instability caused by deposit insurance. Deposit insurance and the relative dominance of agriculture also explain the composition of state banking systems between state and federally chartered institutions.

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  • David C. Wheelock, 1992. "Government policy and banking instability: \"overbanking\" in the 1920s," Working Papers 1992-007, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:1992-007
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    3. Gary Gorton & Richard J. Rosen, 1991. "Overcapacity and exit from banking," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.
    4. Mark D. Flood, 1992. "The great deposit insurance debate," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 51-77.
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    6. Alston, Lee J., 1983. "Farm Foreclosures in the United States During the Interwar Period," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 885-903, December.
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    Keywords

    Bank failures; Deposit insurance;

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