IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedgsq/941.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Monetary Policy: By Rule, By Committee, or By Both? : a speech at the 2017 U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, sponsored by the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, New York, New York, March 3, 2017

Author

Listed:
  • Stanley Fischer

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Stanley Fischer, 2017. "Monetary Policy: By Rule, By Committee, or By Both? : a speech at the 2017 U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, sponsored by the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Busine," Speech 941, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgsq:941
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/fischer20170303c.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clare Lombardelli & James Proudman & James Talbot, 2005. "Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(1), May.
    2. Kevin M. Warsh, 2016. "Institutional Design: Deliberations, Decisions, and Committee Dynamics," Book Chapters,in: John H. Cochrane & John B. Taylor (ed.), Central Bank Governance & Oversight Reforminancial Crisis, chapter 4 Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    3. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2002. "Robust Monetary Policy Rules with Unknown Natural Rates," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(2), pages 63-146.
    4. Taylor, John B, 1979. "Estimation and Control of a Macroeconomic Model with Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1267-1286, September.
    5. Michael D. Bordo, 2016. "Some Historical Reflections on the Governance of the Federal Reserve," Book Chapters,in: John H. Cochrane & John B. Taylor (ed.), Central Bank Governance & Oversight Reforminancial Crisis, chapter 5 Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    6. John H. Cochrane & John B. Taylor (ed.), 2016. "Central Bank Governance & Oversight Reform," Books, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, number 13, December.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7683 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. EllenE. Meade & David Stasavage, 2008. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 695-717, April.
    9. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
    10. John D. Ciorciari & John Taylor (ed.), 2010. "The Road Ahead for the Fed," Books, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, number 2, December.
    11. Michael D. Bordo, 2016. "Some Historical Reflections on the Governance of the Federal Reserve," Book Chapters, in: Michael D. Bordo (ed.), Central bank Governance & Oversight Reform, chapter 5, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    12. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
    13. Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2005. "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033305, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Gerlach-Kristen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2013. "Monetary policy decisions – comparing theory and “inside” information from MPC members," Working Paper 2013/03, Norges Bank.
    2. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018. "Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
    3. Alberto Naudon & Andrés Pérez, 2017. "An Overview of Inflation-Targeting Frameworks: Institutional Arrangements, Decision-making, & the Communication of Monetary Policy," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 811, Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2015. "Monetary Policy Committees: Comparing Theory and "Inside" Information from MPC Members," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 47-89, December.
    5. Francisco Ruge‐Murcia, 2022. "How do central banks make decisions?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1643-1670, November.
    6. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2008. "The Dynamic (In)Efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(5), pages 1001-1032, August.
    7. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2013. "Dispersed communication by central bank committees and the predictability of monetary policy decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 223-244, October.
    8. Henry W. Chappell & Rob Roy Mcgregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2014. "Power‐Sharing in Monetary Policy Committees: Evidence from the United Kingdom and Sweden," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(4), pages 665-692, June.
    9. Stanley Fischer, 2017. "Committee Decisions and Monetary Policy Rules : a speech at \"The Structural Foundations of Monetary Policy,\" a Hoover Institution Monetary Policy Conference, Stanford University, Stanford,," Speech 951, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
    11. Roman Horvath & Marek Rusnak & Katerina Smidkova & Jan Zapal, 2014. "The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(4), pages 450-461, February.
    12. Christian Aubin & Ibrahima Diouf & Dominique Pepin, 2010. "Inertie De La Politique Monétaire Dans La Zone Euro : Le Rôle De L'Hétérogénéité," Post-Print hal-00960030, HAL.
    13. Johnson, Eric D. & Ellis, Michael A. & Kotenko, Diana, 2012. "Consensus building on the FOMC: An analysis of end of tenure policy preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 368-371.
    14. Stephen Hansen & Carlos Velasco Rivera & Michael McMahon, 2013. "How Experts Decide: Preferences or Private Assessments on a Monetary Policy Committee?," CAMA Working Papers 2013-19, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    15. Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2014. "Dissent in monetary policy decisions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-154.
    16. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
    17. Farvaque, Etienne & Malan, Franck & Stanek, Piotr, 2020. "Misplaced childhood: When recession children grow up as central bankers," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    18. Job Swank & Otto Swank & Bauke Visser, 2006. "Transparency and Pre-meetings," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-051/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    19. Tillmann, Peter, 2011. "Strategic forecasting on the FOMC," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 547-553, September.
    20. Kevin M. Warsh, 2016. "Institutional Design: Deliberations, Decisions, and Committee Dynamics," Book Chapters,in: John H. Cochrane & John B. Taylor (ed.), Central Bank Governance & Oversight Reforminancial Crisis, chapter 4 Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgsq:941. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ryan Wolfslayer ; Keisha Fournillier (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbgvus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.