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Hidden Risk

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Abstract

Since 2013, large U.S. hedge fund advisers have been required to report risk exposures in their regulatory filings. Using these data, we first establish that managers’ perceptions of risk contain useful information that is not embedded in fund returns. Investor flows do not respond to this information when managers perceive higher risk than what their past returns would indicate, suggesting managers strategically communicate their risk assessments with investors. During market downturns, investors withdraw capital from funds whose managers perceive higher risk, suggesting they find the performance of these funds in adverse market conditions surprising. These funds are identifiable ex-ante with information that is available to investors.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Barth & Phillip J. Monin & Emil N. Siriwardane & Adi Sunderam, 2024. "Hidden Risk," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-098, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2024-98
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2024.098
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996. "Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 85-110, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Delegated asset management; Hedge funds; Institutional investors; Investor behavior; Investor flows; Principal agent theory; Risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions

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