IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedgfe/2024-21.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Financial Stability Implications of CBDC

Author

Abstract

A Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is a form of digital money that is denominated in the national unit of account, constitutes a direct liability of the central bank, and can be distinguished from other central bank liabilities. We examine the positive and negative implications for financial stability of a CBDC under different design options. We base our analysis on the lessons derived from historical case studies as well as on analytical frameworks useful to characterize the mechanisms through which a CBDC can affect financial stability. We further discuss various policy tools that can be employed to mitigate financial stability risks.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesca Carapella & Jin-Wook Chang & Sebastian Infante & Melissa Leistra & Arazi Lubis & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2024. "Financial Stability Implications of CBDC," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-021, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2024-21
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2024.021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2024021pap.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.17016/FEDS.2024.021?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2009. "Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1588-1607, September.
    2. Garth Baughman & Francesca Carapella, 2023. "A Simple Model of Voluntary Reserve Targets with Tolerance Bands," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2-3), pages 655-672, March.
    3. David Andolfatto, 2020. "Hot Money for a Cold Economy," Working Papers 2020-019, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    4. Keister, Todd & Monnet, Cyril, 2022. "Central bank digital currency: Stability and information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    5. Shy, Oz, 2002. "A quick-and-easy method for estimating switching costs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 71-87, January.
    6. Stenbacka, Rune & Takalo, Tuomas, 2019. "Switching costs and financial stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 14-24.
    7. Anthony A. DeFusco & Andrew Paciorek, 2017. "The Interest Rate Elasticity of Mortgage Demand: Evidence from Bunching at the Conforming Loan Limit," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 210-240, February.
    8. Mark Carlson & Burcu Duygan-Bump & Fabio Natalucci & Bill Nelson & Marcelo Ochoa & Jeremy Stein & Skander Van den Heuvel, 2016. "The Demand for Short-Term, Safe Assets and Financial Stability: Some Evidence and Implications for Central Bank Policies," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 12(4), pages 307-333, December.
    9. David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, 2002. "Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 149-185.
    10. Bassett, William F. & Chosak, Mary Beth & Driscoll, John C. & Zakrajšek, Egon, 2014. "Changes in bank lending standards and the macroeconomy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 23-40.
    11. Francesca Carapella & Jean Flemming, 2020. "Central Bank Digital Currency: A Literature Review," FEDS Notes 2020-11-09-1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, 2005. "Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1293-1327, June.
    13. Garth Baughman & Francesca Carapella, 2020. "Voluntary Reserve Targets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2-3), pages 583-612, March.
    14. Kim, Moshe & Kliger, Doron & Vale, Bent, 2003. "Estimating switching costs: the case of banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 25-56, January.
    15. Lei Li & Yi Li & Marco Macchiavelli & Xing (Alex) Zhou, 2021. "Liquidity Restrictions, Runs, and Central Bank Interventions: Evidence from Money Market Funds [Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(11), pages 5402-5437.
    16. Jonathan Chiu & Seyed Mohammadreza Davoodalhosseini & Janet Jiang & Yu Zhu, 2023. "Bank Market Power and Central Bank Digital Currency: Theory and Quantitative Assessment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1213-1248.
    17. Bindseil, Ulrich & Panetta, Fabio & Terol, Ignacio, 2021. "Central Bank Digital Currency: functional scope, pricing and controls," Occasional Paper Series 286, European Central Bank.
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2010. "Banking panics and policy responses," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 404-419, May.
    2. Toni Ahner & Katrin Assenmacher & Peter Hoffmann & Agnese Leonello & Cyril Monnet & Davide Porcellacchia, 2024. "The Economics of Central Bank Digital Currency," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 20(4), pages 221-274, October.
    3. Ryuichiro Izumi, 2021. "Opacity: Insurance and Fragility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 40, pages 146-169, April.
    4. Voellmy, Lukas, 2024. "Preventing runs under sequential revelation of liquidity needs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    5. Lorenzo Burlon & Manuel A. Muñoz & Frank Smets, 2024. "The Optimal Quantity of CBDC in a Bank-Based Economy," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 172-217, October.
    6. Dionysopoulos, Lambis & Marra, Miriam & Urquhart, Andrew, 2024. "Central bank digital currencies: A critical review," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    7. Todd Keister & Huberto M. Ennis, 2007. "Commitment and Equilibrium Bank Runs," 2007 Meeting Papers 509, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Sebastian Infante & Kyungmin Kim & Anna Orlik & André F. Silva & Robert J. Tetlow, 2022. "The Macroeconomic Implications of CBDC: A Review of the Literature," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-076, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    9. Miah, Mohammad Dulal & Kabir, Md. Nurul & Safiullah, Md, 2020. "Switching costs in Islamic banking: The impact on market power and financial stability," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C).
    10. Sim, Khai Zhi, 2024. "Bank bailouts: Moral hazard and commitment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    11. Bouckaert, Jan & Degryse, Hans & Provoost, Thomas, 2010. "Enhancing market power by reducing switching costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 131-133, November.
    12. DeFusco, Anthony A. & Tang, Huan & Yannelis, Constantine, 2022. "Measuring the welfare cost of asymmetric information in consumer credit markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 821-840.
    13. Makoto (M.) Watanabe & Tarishi Matsuoka, 2019. "Banking Panics and the Lender of Last Resort in a Monetary Economy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-002/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    14. Dilla, Diana, 2017. "Staatsverschuldung und Verschuldungsmentalität [Public Debt and Debt Mentality]," MPRA Paper 79432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Sofia Priazhkina & Samuel Palmer & Pablo Martín-Ramiro & Román Orús & Samuel Mugel & Vladimir Skavysh, 2024. "Digital Payments in Firm Networks: Theory of Adoption and Quantum Algorithm," Staff Working Papers 24-17, Bank of Canada.
    16. Gábor Kézdi & Gergely Csorba, 2013. "Estimating Consumer Lock-In Effects from Firm-Level Data," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 431-452, September.
    17. Wei Yin & Kent Matthews, 2018. "Why Do Firms Switch Banks? Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(9), pages 2040-2052, July.
    18. Todd Keister, 2016. "Bailouts and Financial Fragility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 704-736.
    19. Huang, Pidong, 2013. "Suspension in a Global-Games version of the Diamond-Dybvig model," MPRA Paper 46622, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CBDC; Financial stability; Runs; Stablecoins; Central bank liabilities; Regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2024-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ryan Wolfslayer ; Keisha Fournillier (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbgvus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.