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Safe Collateral, Arm’s-Length Credit: Evidence from the Commercial Real Estate Market

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There are two main creditors in commercial real estate: arm?s-length investors and banks. We model commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) as the less informed source of credit. In equilibrium, these investors fund properties with a low probability of distress and banks fund properties that may require renegotiation. We test the model using the 2007-2009 collapse of the CMBS market as a natural experiment, when banks funded both collateral types. Our results show that properties likely to have been securitized were less likely to default or be renegotiated, consistent with the model. This suggests that securitization in this market funds safe collateral.

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  • Lamont K. Black & John Krainer & Joseph B. Nichols, 2017. "Safe Collateral, Arm’s-Length Credit: Evidence from the Commercial Real Estate Market," Working Paper Series 2017-19, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2017-19
    DOI: 10.24148/wp2017-19
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    Cited by:

    1. Leu, Shawn C.-Y. & Robertson, Mari L., 2021. "Mortgage credit volumes and monetary policy after the Great Recession," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 483-500.
    2. Yavas, Abdullah & Zhu, Shuang, 2024. "Private mortgage securitization and adverse selection—New evidence from expected loan losses," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    3. Xudong An & Lawrence R. Cordell & Nicholas Smith, 2023. "CMBS Market Evolution and Emerging Risks," Working Papers 23-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population

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