IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedcwq/99166.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Note on Aggregating Preferences for Redistribution

Author

Abstract

The policy predictions of standard heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models are often at odds with observed policies. We use the 2021 General Social Survey to investigate the drivers of individuals' preferences over taxes and redistribution. We find that these preferences are more strongly associated with political identity than with economic status. We discuss the implications for quantitative macroeconomic models with endogenous policy determination.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel R. Carroll & Andre Luduvice & Eric Young, 2024. "A Note on Aggregating Preferences for Redistribution," Working Papers 24-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwq:99166
    DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-202427
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202427
    File Function: Persistent Link
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.clevelandfed.org/-/media/project/clevelandfedtenant/clevelandfedsite/publications/working-papers/2024/wp2427.pdf
    File Function: Full Text
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.26509/frbc-wp-202427?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Luduvice, André Victor Doherty, 2024. "The macroeconomic effects of universal basic income programs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    2. Kristoffer B Hvidberg & Claus T Kreiner & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2023. "Social Positions and Fairness Views on Inequality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(6), pages 3083-3118.
    3. Stefanie Stantcheva, 2021. "Understanding Tax Policy: How do People Reason?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 136(4), pages 2309-2369.
    4. Ruediger Bachmann & Jinhui Bai, 2013. "Politico-Economic Inequality and the Comovement of Government Purchases," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(4), pages 565-580, October.
    5. Daniel Carroll & Jim Dolmas & Eric Young, 2021. "The Politics of Flat Taxes," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 39, pages 174-201, January.
    6. Marina Azzimonti & Eva de Francisco & Per Krusell, 2008. "Aggregation and Aggregation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 381-394, 04-05.
    7. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Razin, Assaf & Tesar, Linda L., 1994. "Effective tax rates in macroeconomics: Cross-country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 297-323, December.
    8. Trabandt, Mathias & Uhlig, Harald, 2011. "The Laffer curve revisited," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 305-327.
    9. Roemer, John E., 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 399-424, December.
    10. Ruediger Bachmann & Jinhui Bai, 2013. "Politico-Economic Inequality and the Comovement of Government Purchases," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(4), pages 565-580, October.
    11. Lee, Woojin & Roemer, John E., 2006. "Racism and redistribution in the United States: A solution to the problem of American exceptionalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1027-1052, August.
    12. Wu, Chunzan, 2021. "More unequal income but less progressive taxation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 949-968.
    13. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
    14. Sebastian Dyrda & Marcelo Pedroni, 2023. "Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Model with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Income Risk," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 744-780.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniel R. Carroll & Jim Dolmas & Eric Young, 2015. "Majority Voting: A Quantitative Investigation," Working Papers (Old Series) 1442, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    2. Gustavo de Souza, 2022. "On Political and Economic Determinants of Redistribution: Economic Gains, Ideological Gains, or Institutions?," Working Paper Series WP 2022-47, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    3. Daniel Carroll & Jim Dolmas & Eric Young, 2021. "The Politics of Flat Taxes," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 39, pages 174-201, January.
    4. Ruediger Bachmann & Jinhui Bai & Minjoon Lee & Fudong Zhang, 2020. "The Welfare and Distributional Effects of Fiscal Volatility: a Quantitative Evaluation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 38, pages 127-153, October.
    5. Christian Ghiglino & David Juárez-Luna & Andreas Müller, 2021. "Class Altruism and Redistribution [Institutions, factor pricing, and taxation: virtues of strong states?]," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(640), pages 3274-3295.
    6. Alpino, Matteo & Asatryan, Zareh & Blesse, Sebastian & Wehrhöfer, Nils, 2022. "Austerity and distributional policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 112-127.
    7. Ruediger Bachmann & Jinhui Bai & Minjoon Lee & Fudong Zhang, 2020. "The Welfare and Distributional Effects of Fiscal Volatility: a Quantitative Evaluation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 38, pages 127-153, October.
    8. D’Erasmo, P. & Mendoza, E.G. & Zhang, J., 2016. "What is a Sustainable Public Debt?," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2493-2597, Elsevier.
    9. Röhrs, Sigrid & Winter, Christoph, 2017. "Reducing government debt in the presence of inequality," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-20.
    10. Üngör, Murat, 2014. "Some thought experiments on the changes in labor supply in Turkey," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 265-272.
    11. Erik Lindqvist & Robert Östling, 2013. "Identity and redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 469-491, June.
    12. Redoano, Michela, 2012. "Fiscal Interactions Among European Countries: Does the EU Matter?," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 102, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    13. Toda, Alexis Akira, 2019. "Wealth distribution with random discount factors," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 101-113.
    14. Jo Thori Lind, 2005. "Why is there so little redistribution?," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 111-125.
    15. Sakkas, Stelios & Varthalitis, Petros, 2018. "The (intertemporal) equity-efficiency trade-off of fiscal consolidation," MPRA Paper 90983, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Heer, Burkhard & Rohrbacher, Stefan, 2021. "Endogenous longevity and optimal tax progressivity," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    17. Yuki Uchida & Tetsuo Ono, 2024. "Generational Distribution of Fiscal Burdens: A Positive Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(1), pages 393-430, February.
    18. Ilyana Kuziemko & Nicolas Longuet-Marx & Suresh Naidu, 2024. "“Compensate the Losers?†Economic Policy and Partisan Realignment in the US," Working Papers 321, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    19. Mathias Trabandt & Harald Uhlig, 2012. "How Do Laffer Curves Differ across Countries?," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, pages 211-249, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Pavithra Suryanarayan, 2017. "When do the poor vote for the right-wing and why: Status inequality and vote choice in the Indian states," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-20, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; redistribution; heterogeneous agents; voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwq:99166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: 4D Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbclus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.