Do International Roaming Alliances Harm Consumers?
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More about this item
Keywords
International Roaming; Vertical Relations; Regulation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-NET-2010-01-16 (Network Economics)
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