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Cost-Reducing Alliances and Local Spillovers

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Deroian

    (F.O.R.U.M Université Paris X)

Abstract

Firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other, but cannot fully internalize the shared knowledge. When spillovers are local and transit through the network of alliances, stable architectures with a moderate level of asymmetry are identified.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Deroian, 2005. "Cost-Reducing Alliances and Local Spillovers," Working Papers 2005.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.10
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    2. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Oligopoly; Cost-Reducing alliances; Local spillovers; Network stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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