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Green industrial policy, information asymmetry and repayable advance

Author

Listed:
  • Guy Meunier

    (inrae)

  • Jean-Pierre Ponssard

    (CNRS)

Abstract

The energy transition requires the deployment of risky research and development (R&D) programs, most of which are partially financed by public funding. Recent recovery plans, associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy transition, increased the funding available to finance innovative low-carbon projects and call for an economic evaluation of their allocation. This paper analyzes the potential benefit of using repayable advance: a lump-sum payment to finance the project that is paid back in case of success. The relationship between the state and innovative firms is formalized in the principal agent framework. Investing in an innovative project requires an initial observable capital outlay. We introduce asymmetric information on the probability of success, which is known to the firm but not to the state agency. The outcome of the project, if successful, delivers a private benefit to the firm and an external social benefit to the state. In this context a repayable advance consists in rewarding failure. We prove that it is a superior strategy in the presence of pure adverse selection. We investigate under what conditions this result could be extended in the presence of moral hazard. Implications for green industrial policy are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Guy Meunier & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2023. "Green industrial policy, information asymmetry and repayable advance," Working Papers 2023.04, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:fae:wpaper:2023.04
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    Keywords

    green innovation; public financing; information structure; conditional schemes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
    • D25 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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